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LABOR LAw-LABoR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT-EMERGENCY STRIKE PRoVISlONs-Suit by the United States, under authority of the National Emergency
provisions of Title II of the Labor-Management Relations Act,1 to enjoin a strike
in a single plant engaged in the manufacture of pipe used in the construction of
atomic energy plants. The district court granted an injunction,2 and the labor
organizations adversely affected thereby appealed. Held, affirmed. The threatened strike would have affected a substantial part of the atomic weapon industry
and would have imperiled the national safety. United States 11. United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 132.
The principal case involves the use of the emergency strike provisions for the
tenth time since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.3 In each of the
other instances the dispute was clearly nation-wide or industry-wide, and this
is the first time that the "cooling-off" injunction has been used in a strike which
was local and did not substantially affect the industry in which the strike took
place.4 The court rejected the union's contention that only nation-wide or industry-wide strikes were subject to the emergency injunction and based its holding on the legislative history of these provisions and the policy of the LaborManagement Relations Act as expressed by Congress in section l(b). 5 It is at
1 61 Stat. L. 155-156, §§206-210 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§176-180.
Section 208 provides:
"(a) Upon receiving a report from a board of inquiry the President may direct the
Attorney General to petition any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties to enjoin such strike or lock-out or the continuing thereof, and if the court finds
that such threatened or actual strike or lock-out(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof ••. and
(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or safety,
it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lock-out, or the continuing thereof,
and to make such other orders as may be appropriate."
2 United States v. American Locomotive Co., (D.C. ID. 1952) 109 F. Supp. 78.
3 For a discussion of the other instances when the emergency strike provisions were
used, see WITNBY, GOVERNMENT AND CoLLBCTIVE BARGAINING 503-504 (1951); Warren,
"National Emergency Provisions,'' 4 Lui. L.J. 130 (1953); Fleming, "Taft-Hartley Law
To Date," 1949 Wis. L. Rnv. 61 at 95.
4 At page 134 of the principal case, the court states, " •.. the threatened strike would
not have affected all, or a substantial part of that [prefabricated pipe] industry."
5 "It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce • • • to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the
public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947).
Query whether this was intended to expand the scope of the emergency strike provisions?
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least doubtful whether the legislative history indicates an intention on the part
of Congress to apply the drastic remedy of injunction in cases of local strikes.
The House bill would have made an injunction available whenever the President found "... that a labor dispute has resulted in, or imminently threatens to
result in, the cessation or substantial curtailment of interstate or foreign commerce...."6 The broad wording of the House bill was rejected in favor of the
present provisions which are substantially like the Senate bill,7 except that the
Senate bill applied only when an entire industry would be affected and not when
a substantial part of an industry would be affected. Little attention was given
to the possibility of the use of the injunction in local strikes during the debates,8
and discussion, pro and con, seemed to be based on the assumption that only
nation-wide or industry-wide stoppages could be enjoined. 9 The major point
of contention was the method to be employed in dealing with national emergencies,10 rather than what would constitute a national emergency. However,
the court felt that even though Congress was primarily concerned with nationwide and industry-wide strikes, it did not intend to limit the revival of the injunction to those cases exclusively.11 In reaching this conclusion the court
found an implied intention which is not at all apparent.

6

H.R. 3020, §203, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947).

7 S. 1126,
8 H. Min.

§208, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947).
Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 102 (1947) attacked the wording of
H.R. 3020, §203 and claimed that "substantial curtailment" of interstate commerce is " •.•
not defined, and could conceivably be broadened to a point of being all-inclusive. There is no
rule, or yardstick, provided for the President to guide him in his determination as to whether
or not a 'substantial curtailment' of interstate or foreign commerce has occurred or is about
to occur. Neither is there any guide to determine whether this 'substantial curtailment'
refers to any particular plant, or any particular group of plants or industry as a whole." The
only other discussion of the use of the emergency strike provisions in local strikes was in a
speech by Senator Pepper, in which he attacked the addition of the words "or a substantial
part thereof" to the Senate bill in the final draft. Senator Pepper felt that these words made
the provisions applicable in strikes of less than industry-wide scope. 93 CONG. R:sc. 6520
(1947).
9 Typical of the comments on the scope of the emergency strike provisions, was that
by Representative Robison when he said, ''It does permit the Federal Government to issue
an injunction in cases where there is or [is] about to be a stoppage of work in an industry
which threatens the public health and security of the Nation. It must be in a Nation-wide
dispute and it must be clearly shown to the court that the public health and security of the
Nation are threatened." Emphasis added. 93 CoNG. R:sc. 7491 (1947). See also 93 CoNG.
R:sc. 3524-3525, 4281, 4902, 4985, 5006, 7536, A3043 (1947).
1 For a discussion of the history of injunctions in labor disputes, and three methods of
dealing with emergency disputes (seizure, compulsory arbitration, and cooling-off periods),
see Teller, "The Taft-Hartley Act and 'Government By Injunction,'" 35 VA. L. R:sv. 50
(1949). See also WITNEY, GoVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 512-515 (1951),
where it is suggested that there be an injunction and a seizure with confiscation of profits
in order to coerce labor and management into a settlement by "free collective bargaining."
11 Principal case at 137. For a criticism of the lack of any definition of a national
emergency in the Taft-Hartley Act, see Sigal, "National Emergency Strikes and the
Public Interest,'' 27 N.C. L. R:sv. 213 at 217 (1949), and for a discussion of the principal
case, Warren, ''National-Emergency Provisions,'' 4 LAB. L.J. 130 at 133 (1953).
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The instant case is exceptional in that the ato.mic energy industry was involved, 12 and it does not necessarily follow that hereafter all local emergencies
are within the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. However, it must be recognized that the language of sections 206-210 provide no criteria for the President
or the courts to use in determining when a national emergency exists or is
threatened,13 and this case may provide a basis for the use of the act in connection with public utility stoppages when state emergency strike laws are not
applicable because of the supersedence of federal law. 14

Walter H. Weiner, S. Ed.

12 For a discussion of the applicability of the emergency strike provisions in the atomic
energy industry, see Smith, "The Effect of the Public Interest on the Right to Strike and
to Bargain Collectively," 27 N.C. L. REv. 204 (1949).
13 The factors to be considered in determining whether a national emergency exists
are discussed in WITNEY, GovERNMENr AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 501 (1951).
14 See Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees
of America, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct.
359 (1951), in which the Court ruled that Congress intended to make collective bargaining
available in all situations except where it expressly provided to the contrary, and that the
state compulsory arbitration statute for public utility strikes was therefore unconstitutional.
The Court indicated, however, that since the Wisconsin statute applied to all public utility
strikes whether or not an emergency existed, the result may be otherwise with a state
emergency strike law. For a survey of state emergency strike legislation, see Willcox and
Landis, "Government Seizures in Labor Disputes," 34 CoRN. L.Q. 155 (1948); Updegraff,
"Compulsory Settlement of Public Utility Disputes," 36 IowA L. REv. 61 (1950).

